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PLEA BARGAINING IN NORTH CAROLINA
JAmES

E. BoNDt

INTRODUCTION

Plea bargaining practices, as described by twenty of the thirty
North Carolina district attorneys who answered the questionnaire reproduced in the Appendix, vary widely. In one district, for example,
the prosecutor does not bargain at all although in eighty-five percent of
his cases the defendant nonetheless pleads guilty. In another district the
prosecutor estimates that he bargains for four-fifths of the guilty pleas
that defendants enter in ninety-five percent of his cases. Those prosecutors who regularly negotiate pleas (and that includes three-quarters of
the district attorneys who responded) do not invariably offer similar
defendants similar inducements although most do use at one time or
another the three standard inducements: charge dismissal, charge reduction and sentence recommendation. Some prosecutors, for example,
regularly recommend sentences while others rarely recommend one.
Beyond the strength of the government's case and the character and
past record of the defendant, all of which most prosecutors recognize as
relevant factors, the prosecutors do not agree upon those other factors
that influence the decision to negotiate or to agree to a particular
disposition pursuant to a plea. The prosecutors also organize their
offices differently for plea bargaining purposes: a few district attorneys
insist on negotiating or at least approving all bargains; most, however,
give staff attorneys wide discretion to negotiate pleas. A few prosecutors have established some minimal guidelines for negotiating pleas, but
most have not. Varying degrees of judicial participation in the bargaining process further differentiate practice from one district to another
and, indeed, within districts. This very variety in plea bargaining
practices within North Carolina demonstrates that practices here parallel
those in other jurisdictions, since similar surveys have shown similar
diversity in plea bargaining practices within other jurisdictions.'
t Assoc. Professor, Wake Forest Law School; A.B., Wabash College; LL.B.,
Harvard University; LL.M., SJ.D., University of Virginia.
1. E.g., Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in
Massachusetts, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 292, 301 (1969) (the percentage of guilty pleas
varies from eighty percent in one county to thirteen percent in another); Klonoski,
Mitchell & Gallagher, Plea Bargaining in Oregon: An Exploratory Study, 50 Opt. L.
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In addition to showing that plea bargaining practices in North
Carolina vary as do practices elsewhere, the survey highlighted the
existence here of several problems, common to other jurisdictions, that
merit extended discussion. These problems may be grouped into two
broad categories. The first are "process" problems and include the role
the judge should play in the process and the degree to which a defendant who pleads guilty should receive a less severe sentence than the
otherwise similarly situated defendant who is convicted after contesting
his guilt at trial. The second are "internal management" problems and
include the question of who within the prosecutor's office should have
responsibility for negotiating pleas and the question whether procedural
and substantive guidelines for bargaining should be established within
the prosecutor's office. While some of these problems-most notably,
the problem of judicial participation in the bargaining process-have
generated considerable professional debate, 2 others-particularly, the
problems of internal management-have not." All must be discussed,
however, because the survey responses reveal not only different practice
in all these areas but also doubt about the legitimacy or at least desirability of some of the prevailing practices. Practices may, of course, differ and yet be equally justified and reasonable. On the other hand,
practices may differ for irrational reasons, and one practice may be
demonstrably preferable to another.
PROCESS PROBLEMS

JudicialParticipationin PleaBargaining
The North Carolina legislature has recently authorized judicial
participation in plea bargaining despite the recommendation of the
Rav. 114, 118 (1971) (the incidence of plea bargaining varies from zero percent in one
county to ninety-five percent in another); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 864, 898 (1964) (different

prosecutors offer different inducements to secure guilty pleas).
2. E.g., Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 26

(1972); Gallagher, Judicial Participationin Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards, 9 HARv. Crv. RIxrs-Cw. Lm. L REV. 29 (1974); Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and
the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1972); Recent Development, Judicial Plea

Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. Rv. 1082 (1967); Note, Judicial Participationin Guilty PleasA Search for Standards, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 151 (1971); Note, Criminal ProcedurePlea Bargaining-TrialJudge's Participationin Plea Negotiations Does Not Render Plea

Involuntary, 24 VAN. L. Ray. 836 (1971).
3. Although internal management problems are occasionally mentioned in the vast
and growing literature of plea bargaining, tney are seldom thoroughly discussed. Two
exceptions are Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscre-

tion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 1 (1971), and White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea
BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971).
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Criminal Code Commission that it be forbidden. 4 While every professional panel that has studied the role of the judge in the bargaining
process has recommended against permitting his participation,5 the most
thorough and prestigious of these study panels would permit the judge
to indicate whether he approves a particular bargain prior to the defendant's entry of a guilty plea pursuant to the agreement.' The United
States Supreme Court, however, has recently recommended and Congress has adopted a procedure that apparently proscribes such "ratifica-

tion" of negotiated pleas in the federal courts. 7 Since North Carolina
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021 (Supp. 1975) states:
Plea conference; improper pressure prohibited; submission of arrangement to judge.-(a) In superior courts, the prosecution arnd the defense may discuss the possibility that, upon the defendant's entry of a plea of
guilty or no contest to one or more offenses, the solicitor will not charge, will
dismiss, or will move for the dismissal of other charges, or will recommend
or not oppose a particular sentence. If the defendant is represented by counsel
in the discussions the defendant need not be present. The trial judge may participate in the discussions.
5.

ABA PRoJEcr ON MINIMUm STANDARDS

FOR CRMNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY,Standard 3.3 (a) (Tenatative Draft, as amended 1968)
("The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.")

[hereinafter cited as PLEAS

oF GUILTY]; NATIONAL ADViSORY COMM'N ON CRmImAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
TASK FORCE ON COURTS, Standard 3.7 (1973) ('The court should not participate in plea
negotiations.").

See also ABA

Comm.

on Professional

Ethics, Informal Opinions

(#779), 51 A.B.A.J. 444 (1965) (judge should not become a party to any advance arrangement for the determination of a sentence).
6. PLEAS OF GUIrTY, Standard 3.3, provides:
Responsibilites of the trial judge.
(a) The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.
(b) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the expectation that other
charges before that court will be dismissed or that sentence concessions will
be granted, upon request of the parties the trial judge may permit the disclosure
to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the
time for tender of the plea. He may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed disposition if the
information in the presentence report is consistent with the reprsentations
made to him. If the trial judge concurs, but later decides that the final disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by
the plea agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(c) When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is tendered or received as
a result of a prior plea agreement, the trial judge should give the agreement
due consideration, but notwithstanding its existence he should reach an independent decision on whether to grant charge or sentence concessions under the
principles set forth in section 1.8.
7. FED. R. Cium. P. 11(e) states:
(1) In General.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached
by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require a disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time
the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement,
or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been
an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
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General Statutes section 15A-1021 does not specify the degree of permissible judicial participation, the question remains: how extensively
may the judge participate without running afoul of due process restraints on his participation? And even if due process does permit
judicial participation beyond that permitted in the federal courts or
recommended by the ABA, is any such additional judicial involvement
desirable?
The answer to these questions must be explored because some
North Carolina judges do participate actively in the bargaining process.
One district attorney reported that some judges strike bargains without
his consent and that he could only "digress therefrom at his peril."
Another estimated that perhaps one-quarter of the judges in his district
might "suggest a good disposition" to counsel gathered in their chambers. "Sometimes," answered one prosecutor, "a judge will recommend
a particular disposition after hearing some evidence." Of course, the
degree of judicial participation depends, as many of the district attorneys
pointed out, on the attitude of the particular judge. While most judges
do not participate actively, some do, at least occasionally. And more
may be tempted to do so since the General Assembly has now given
active judicial participation its legislative blessing.
Due process may, however, restrict judicial participation that
would otherwise be permissible under section 15A-1021. Because the
judge has the final say on the defendant's sentence, a judge who
participates in negotiations may coerce the defendant into pleading
guilty. In a few reported cases, judges have delivered ultimatums to
defendants who then capitulated and pleaded guilty.8 When the judge

actually threatens the defendant, his plea can scarcely be characterized
as voluntary under any conceivable definition of that term.0 Such judiAlthough this rule does not necessarily reflect a constitutional command, federal practice
rules are often transformed over time into constitutional commands. See, e.g., Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969) (Harlan and Black, JJ., dissenting) ("What is now
in effect being held is that the prophylactic procedures of Criminal Rule 11 are
substantially applicable to the states as a matter of federal constitutional due process.").
8. E.g., United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (judge stated
that he would impose consecutive maximum sentences if defendant went to trial and was
found guilty); People v. Clark, 183 Colo. 201, 515 P.2d 1242 (1973) (judge warned
defendant that he would put him away "forever" if he did not accept bargain); Letters v.
Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403, 193 N.E.2d 578 (1963) (judge threatened to impose a
"life on life" sentence upon conviction unless defendant pleaded guilty).
9. "Mhe term [voluntariness] is an exceedingly ambiguous term. This stems not
only from the difficulties involved in trying to discover a past state of mind but also from
the fact that we do not even have a clear idea of what, if any, psychological facts or
experiences we are looking for." ENKER, TAsK FoRcE REPORT: THm CourTs 108 (1967).
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cial bullying, which coerces a defendant into pleading guilty and thereby violates his constitutional rights, is impermissible regardless of section 15A-1021.
At the same time, several district attorneys recognized, as other
observers have elsewhere insisted,'10 that a defendant must know the
judge's attitude before he can intelligently plead.
"Sometimes the defense lawyer must have knowledge of what the
judge is going to do to his man. This information seems to be
necessary before some defendants will plead."
As one fatalist pointed out, "There is no need to reach a plea
bargain if the judge will not agree."
The judge's attitude toward the proposed bargain may be ascertained in different ways, however.
"Obviously, a sentence bargain requires participation of the judge."
",The judge] should be present because in a true plea bargain case
the punishment should be agreed upon."
"The judge should be willing to state what punishment he will
impose. ..
"The judge should be approached by both counsel after they have
agreed to a proposed disposition."
"Though he should not participate in negotiation, the judge has the
authority finally to either accept or to reject such negotiations."
The preceding comments illustrate the many different ways in which
counsel can ascertain the judge's attitude toward any proposed disposition.
Basically, these answers reflect two different views of the appropriate role of the judge in the bargaining process. Some see him as a
"ratifier"; others see him as a "mediator." As a ratifier, the judge
would not actively participate in the bargaining itself. Instead the
prosecutor and the defense counsel would work out an agreement
satisfactory to them and thereafter present it to the judge for his approval. Presumably, the judge might then exercise any one of three options:
he might reject the deal; he might approve it; or he might approve it
tentatively, subject to his receipt and review of the presentence report.
If either defense counsel or prosecutor is familiar with the judge's usual
10. E.g., Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) (justice is
better served by a forthright disclosure of the state of mind of the judge). See also
Recent Development, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 STAN. L REv. 1082, 1091 (1967)
(failure to explain sentencing policy may undercut the understanding with which the
defendant pleads).
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sentencing policies, they should normally be able to work out an agreement that will satisfy him as well as themselves. The judge would then
approve their agreements as a matter of course."1 Even if the judge
gave only his tentative approval, as might seem the more prudent
course, 12 that practice would not usually yield different results except
when the defendant has withheld pertinent information from his lawyer
or when new information unexpectedly comes to light after the agreement has been presented to the judge.
The ratifying judge who simply disapproves the bargain may find
himself mediating, however. Counsel will doubtless ask why he has
rejected their agreement. His explanation may suggest the terms that
would satisfy him. In practice, then, the distinction between ratification
and mediation may make no difference because the judge will find
himself inevitably drawn into the bargaining process.'3 If the judge
explicitly assumes a mediating function, he will certainly go beyond the
discrete "suggestion!' or "hint" inherent in any disapproval during the
ratification process. He may offer the defense counsel a particular
sentence for his client's plea.
Unfortunately, such judicial mediation may impermissibly induce
guilty pleas. Since the judge alone has the power to impose sentence, he
does possess, after all, much greater power than does the ordinary
mediator to induce acceptance of his terms. Indeed one surmises that
the prosecutor's awareness of the judge's ultimate authority underlies the
general distaste for judicial presence during the plea bargaining discussions because any opinion the judge expresses will circumscribe the

prosecutor's ability to negotiate more favorable terms. 14 Even if the
judge does not bully or threaten, the defendant will probably conclude
11. In many jurisdictions the judge uniformly follows any recommendation the
prosecutor makes in order to reinforce the prosecutor's bargaining authority.
12. E.g., United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973). FnD R. CuM. P.
11 (e)(2) permits the judge to withhold approval of any agreement until he has had an
opportunity to see the presentence report.
13. Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 LINCOLN L. Rnv. 137, 197
(1972) ("A system of ratification may indirectly result in judge participation through the
successive submission and rejection of plea bargains."); cf. Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d
1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1970) ("Continued bargaining, with repeated submission of
agreements to the judge for his ratification, would involve the judge in the formulation of
the final agreement."); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(concurring opinion) (judicial ratification is "inherently coercive").
14. One respondent simply said: "Iprefer not to have a judge present." Another
alleged that his presence "at plea negotiations is generally counter-productive." Cf.
White, A Proposalfor Reform of the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. Rpv. 439,
452 (1971) ("Mhe judge's presence actually inhibited meaningful negotiation and
decreased the chances of reaching a plea bargain.").
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that he will get a worse sentence if he declines the judge's offer, goes to
trial, and is convicted. The voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea
in such circumstances is debatable.
Moreover, the judge who mediates risks compromising his obligations to the system. As an official in the system, he must see that justice
is done, and he therefore has responsibilities apart from. facilitating
agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant. The defendant is
presumably interested in securing the lightest possible sentence while the
judge is presumably interested in imposing an appropriate sentence.
In such cases, the judge's interests do not coincide with those of the
defendant. The judge thus faces a dilemma: he must either pressure
the defendant into accepting a particular agreement, or he must shirk
his duty to see that justice is done.' 5
If the bargaining in which the judge has participated fails to
produce any agreement and the defendant goes to trial, the judge's prior
participation in the bargaining may preclude his trying the case fairly.
Having assumed that the defendant is guilty, the judge must now
presume him innocent. Having already decided what sentence the
de2endant deserves, the judge must now act as if he had never decided
that question. Whether the average judge can summon that degree of
impartiality is doubtful even though some judges have vigorously asserted that they can.""
Finally, as several district attorneys pointed out in their responses,
judicial participation in the bargaining process may create the appearance of impropriety. Every judge who participates in bargaining subjects himself to charges of partiality if he subsequently finds the defendant guilty or imposes a stiff sentence on him after trial. Judges, who
must always guard against even the appearance of impropriety,' 7 may
therefore conclude that they should decline any invitation to mediate a
bargaining impasse.' 8 One of the district attorneys observed: "In order
to preserve his judicial authority the judge should steer as clear of
bargaining as possible."
The latter two problems-partiality and the appearance of impro15. See note 8 supra.
16. See Lambros, Plea Bargainingand the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509, 517
(1972).
17. ABA CoDE oF JuDmcrAL CoNucr, Canon 2 states: "A Judge Should Avoid
Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities."
18. "'If a judge allows himself to get into fplea bargaining] he may do some good
in the odd case, but in the long run he disparages himself and he disparages the
administration of justice."' Ferguson, supra note 2, at 46.
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priety-may be solved short of banning judicial participation in bargaining, at least in multi-judge courts. One judge could do all the
bargaining while his colleagues tried cases not "dealt out"; or, alternatively, a defendants case would be assigned to a judge other than one
with whom he bargained if he decided to contest rather than to concede
his guilt. 19 The point.here is that North Carolina judges who actively
involve themselves in bargaining do not follow either of these procedures, and these procedures are not prescribed by the statute that
permits judicial participation.
JudicialImposition of Different Sentences
Judicial absence from the bargaining process itself does not eliminate the possibility that other judicial practices may still coerce pleas.
In particular, the judicial practice of sentencing defendants who go to
trial and are convicted more severely than otherwise similarly situated
defendants who plead may illegitimately induce pleas. 20 The practice
of differential sentencing is admittedly widespread among North Carolina judges because roughly three-quarters of the prosecutors agreed that
in their jurisdiction a defendant who pleaded guilty generally received a
lesser sentence than a similar defendant who was convicted after pleading not guilty. A very large percentage of defendants probably plead
guilty solely because they believe they will be treated more leniently than
if they contested the charges and lost. The unspoken promise of a
lighter sentence may thus tempt the defendant to forego exercising his
constitutional right to a trial, yet the federal courts have consistently
admonished officials against practices which "chill" exercise of constitutional rights.21
Tacit plea bargaining, as the practice of pleading guilty in expectation of a lenient sentence has come to be known, is defended by many.22
19. Cf. United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 639 (8th Cir. 1973) ("After
rejecting a plea . . . a judge may excuse himself from further involvement in the case
...
"); Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1359 (4th Cir. 1970) (dissent) ("If a plea
bargain is rejected, it should be a simple matter for the judge to disqualify himself and
send the parties to another judge for consideration of their revised agreement.").
20. E.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (trial judge
may not "create incentives for guilty pleas by a policy of differential sentences").
21. E.g., Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 1966) ("When [the
defendant] received harsher punishment than the court would have decreed had he
waived his Fifth Amendment rights, he paid a judicially imposed penalty for exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed rights.").
22. The basic defense is a practical one. Unless a defendant gains a tangible benefit
from entering his plea, he will decline to do so; and the system will collapse under the
burden of the resulting trials. But see Newman & NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety in
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The common defenses were repeated in the survey responses. First,
some view the plea of guilty as the "first admission of guilt and step in
rehabilitation." 23 From that point of view, "no one gets more time
than he should by pleading not guilty and going to trial [but] most
people by pleading guilty get less time than the facts of the crime would
ordinarily call for because they have just taken the first step forward
in their own rehabilitation." The judgment that one who pleads guilty
has taken the first step toward rehabilitation is, however, widely disputed.24 The experienced defendant may simply weep crocodile tears
of remorse because he knows that that is the role he is expected to
assume in exchange for the light sentence. In any case, the defendant
who goes to trial and is convicted may not understand the distinction
between a fellow prisoner's being punished less severely and his
own being punished more severely, and one ought not to discount
the importance for purposes of rehabilitation of the defendant's belief
that he was treated fairly.25
A second explanation for the sentencing differential is also thought
to justify imposition of a more serious penalty. As one prosecutor
observed: "Almost invariably more detrimental information comes out
about the defendant at a full scale trial." Another made the same point
more vividly: "Generally when the defendant pleads guilty it does not
come out what a sorry S.O.B. the defendant is." The judge who sees the
defendant only briefly at a plea taking does not have much of an
opportunity to form any opinions based on his personal observation of
the defendant, whereas the presiding judge may have considerable opportunity to observe the defendant during the course of a trial. Can one
doubt that the defendant's leaping across the counsel table to attack the
judge, as Mr. Manson did in his celebrated trial, affected the judge's
assessment of Mr. Mansoni's dangerousness? On the other hand, it is
possible that a defendant who conducts himself decorously during his
trial might well receive a lighter sentence than one who pleads guilty.
Negotiated Justice, 47 DEN. LJ. 367, 375 (1970) (the thesis that abolition of plea
bargaining would result in many more trials is only an assumption).
23. E.g., Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) ("It is
almost axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation of an offender is the offender's
recognition that he was at fault.").
24. E.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 271 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("A glib
willingness to admit guilt in order to 'secure something in return' may indicate something
quite the opposite of repentance. ...

).

25. See generally Ohl
& Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon
Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 .[Aw & CONrEMP. PRoD. 495
(1958).
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In any case, the judge's imposing a stiffer sentence at least partly on the
basis of negative personal observations seems wholly defensible. Imposition by the judge of a stiffer sentence on the basis of negative
information other than his personal observation seems less defensible,
however, because that action suggests that the parties did not fully
disclose to the judge either the pleading defendant's background or the
circumstances of his crime.28 Regrettably, the survey respondents did
not specify the source of the additional negative information that in their
judgment justified imposition of a stiffer sentence on the defendant who
contested his guilt and lost.
What emerges from the trial may not be additional detrimental
information about the defendant's character or criminal conduct but
rather a judicial conviction that the defendant has lied. Many criminal
defendants do tell tall tales which, if true, would make the maxim that
truth is stranger than fiction a gross understatement. The judge may
therefore increase the defendant's sentence to punish him for perjuring
himself. Whether he should be thus punished for "committing" a crime
with which he has not been charged (much less convicted) is questionable, however.27 Even more questionable is the contention that the
defendant should be punished for needlessly forcing the state to prove its
case. One prosecutor put this point bluntly: "A defendant who obstinately forces the state to trial when his guilt is overwhelmingly apparent
receives a heavier sentence than if he had admitted such obvious guilt."
He added: "If a defendant has a plausible defense and there are
substantial issues regarding guilt or innocence, the defendant is not
penalized by carrying his question to the jury." The right to a trial is a
constitutional right to which all defendants are entitled. Its exercise is
not-and probably ought not to be---conditioned on the existence of a
"colorable" factual claim of innocence. One can scarcely imagine the
courts sustaining the constitutionality of a statute authorizing additional
26. If the judge felt compelled to impose upon a pleading defendant a heavier
sentence than previously agreed to because new information had come to light, he might
well permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. Contrast Vanater v. Boles, 377 F.2d
898 (4th Cir. 1967), United States v. Norstrand Corp., 168 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1948),
and State v. Ramos, 85 N.M. 438, 512 P.2d 1274 (1973) (a guilty pleading defendant
who has been advised that judge may impose a different sentence cannot complain if
judge does so), with United States ex reL Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1972), and People v. Morgan, 21 Cal. App. 3d 33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1971) (a guilty
pleading defendant who has been advised that judge may impose a different sentence may
nevertheless withdraw his plea if judge does so).
27. United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972) (greater sentence cannot
be imposed at retrial just because a comparison of defendant's testimony at trial and
before a grand jury indicated perjury at one or the other).
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punishment for the defendant's "frivolous" exercise of the constitutional
right to trial. What legislatures cannot do formally, judges ought not to
do sub rosa.2s
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

Substantive PleaBargainingPolicies
Most North Carolina prosecutors, like their counterparts elsewhere,
have not reduced their plea bargaining practices to written policies, and
most do not wish to formalize their practices in that manner.29 Although one prosecutor did say that he thought he ought to establish
bargaining guidelines, a fellow district attorney probably summarized
the views of most North Carolina prosecutors when he said: "Every
case is different; every defendant is different. There can be no hard
and fast rules in this business." The self-evident truth of the preceding
premise may not justify its conclusion, however.
The assertion that every case is different is an unilluminating
truism. Of course, every case is different if for no other reason than
that the specific offense has occurred at a particular time and place
different from any other. In that sense every murder is different. Yet
few would opt for a statute which defines murder as simply the "unlawful killing of a human being" subject to a penalty ranging from a
suspended sentence to death to be imposed at the judge's (or jury's)
discretion. While such a statute would impose no "hard and fast" rules,
it would also permit such divergent treatment of similarly situated
defendants that our sense of justice would be offended. Most of us
would therefore opt for a statutory classification of different kinds of
murder with a specified range of penalties more narrowly gauged to
some judgment about the relative evil of the respective categories of
homicide. The question is not then whether every case is different, but
whether admittedly different cases nevertheless fall into categories which
may be usefully defined for purposes of similar treatment.
On the latter question what North Carolina prosecutors do speaks
28. United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 948 (1973) (imposition of additional punishment "for taking the court's time with a
trial" chills defendant's constitutional rights).
29. The American Bar Association has, however, recommended that every prosecutor's office should develop and reduce to writing guidelines on plea bargaining. ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FmCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 2.5 (Tentative Draft

1970) [hereinafter cited as THE PROSE=ON FUNCrION].
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more loudly than what they say. For despite prosecutional reluctance to
formalize their bargaining policies, most district attorneys concede that
they regularly consider some common factors when bargaining with a
defendant. The most frequently mentioned factor is the strength of the
government's case: the stronger the government's case, the less willingly
the prosecutor bargains. The second most frequently mentioned factor
was the defendant's general character and past record. The nature of
the charge against the defendant and his willingness to assist law enforcement officials in their work were two other factors repeatedly
mentioned by survey respondents. Several prosecutors said that they
also took into account the feelings of the victim and law enforcement
officers. The prosecutor presumably adopts a tougher bargaining stance
where the victim and/or the police "demand" it. The identity of
the judge and the defense attorney also apparently influences the prosecutor's judgment about the likelihood of prevailing at trial or getting a
particular sentence. And while only two prosecutors explicitly identified expense as a relevant factor, the time and energy that any trial
consumes must be an omnipresent factor. The variety of factors that
prosecutors weigh in their bargaining decisions was perhaps best summarized by the district attorney who simply, if somewhat unilluminat30
ingly, responded, "I consider a multitude of factors.
While many of the factors cited above may be appropriate considerations, others may not be. Many commentators, for example, criticize
prosecutors for relying so heavily on the strength of their cases. The
legitimacy of the prosecutor's relying on the strength of his case may
depend on his motivation: he may be interested in holding out for an
appropriate disposition of the offender whose guilt is clear, or he may be
interested in securing conviction of an offender whose guilt may or may
not be clear. The most questionable aspect of the prosecutor's emphasis
on the strength of his case is, however, the implicit assumption that
"weak" cases should be dealt out rather than tried. Arguably, "weak"
cases are the very ones that ought to be tried, at least where the
weakness stems from conflicting evidence on the question of guilt."1
30. In a similar survey two-thirds of the responding prosecutors said that they
weighed at least six factors in deciding whether to bargain and what to offer, and twelve
percent said that they weighed ten or more factors. Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rv., supra
note 1, at 902.
31. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50,
62 (1968); Specter, Book Review, 76 YA., LJ. 604, 606 (1967). A case may be "weak"
for any of several reasons, of course, and the nature of the weakness may determine
whether the case should be compromised or tried. See generally White, supra note 3, at
450-52.
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Even the reliance upon character and past record, which. most critics
concede are relevant considerations (presumably, because they bear
some relation to the defendant's culpability and need for punishment),
poses difficult questions. On the basis of his background, the white,
middle class defendant will qualify for lenient treatment far more often
than will the black, ghetto defendant. Even if that result does not
offend equal protection strictures, it may trouble the conscientious prosecutor.12 And while few would dispute the prosecutor's considering the
seriousness of the charge, many would dispute how he determines the
seriousness of the charge. Does he look solely to the table of punishments? Or should he weigh community attitudes toward the crime?
Again, the conscientious prosecutor may be troubled by whatever
answer he gives to the preceding questions. If he looks beyond the
table of punishments, he may feel that he is subverting the legislative
will. If he ignores community sensibilities, he may feel as if he is a
latter day Moloch. 3
In spite of the difficulty of framing satisfactory bargaining guidelines, a few prosecutors have articulated relatively fixed policies in a
small number of frequently recurring situations. One prosecutor states
that "often in cases of first offenders, we reduce felonies to misdemeanors." Another insists that any DUI case "dealt out" must be dealt out at
the district court level. In the superior court the prosecutor then tries
every DUI case and thereafter opposes any plea for a restricted license.
A second prosecutor also said his office had adopted formal rules for
dealing with DUI cases but declined to specify their nature.
The prosecutor's reluctance to articulate substantive bargaining
policies formally or even to explain those that are followed is understandable. Each case is different; moreover, the district attorney realizes
that the articulation of rules will inevitably constrain his exercise of
discretion. Particularly when the policies are published or otherwise
become public knowledge, he faces two threats to his discretion. First,
courts may scrutinize the validity of the policies either generally or as
applied to a particular case. Second, defense counsel may insist on
application of specific policies to his case even though his is a doubtful
32. See State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964) (per curiam) (gainfully
employed college graduate who was married and had three small children agreed to seek
private psychiatric care in exchange for nolle prosequi of indictments charging open
lewdness).
33. See generally Brezner, How the Prosecuting Attorney's Office Processes
Complaints, 27 Dan'. LAw. 3 (1959).
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case for application, or alternatively, on their non-application because
his case is arguably different even though it clearly falls within the
category to which the policy applies.
Additionally, the prosecutor is an elected official who must periodically answer to a public that believes in the myth of full and effective
enforcement. He risks losing his job if he admits that he does not
always fully prosecute every criminal. Similarly, he risks losing his job
if he does not convict a very high percentage of those whom he prosecutes. This need to build a prosecutional record that will satisfy the
public may well explain many prosecutional bargaining policies. If the
prosecutor, for example, tried only or even primarily the "weak" cases,
his conviction rate-which is widely regarded as the one accurate measurement of his effectiveness-would probably drop dramatically.
The last example may nevertheless demonstrate the need for formally articulated bargaining policies. The disagreement over whether
to bargain or try weak cases reflects a disagreement over the nature and
purpose of the bargaining process itself. Some other bargaining policies
reflect a greater emphasis on the practical need to move cases than on
the fulfillment of the purposes of the criminal law. 4 Unless and until
the prosecutor formally articulates his bargaining policies, neither
the public nor the profession can fairly evaluate his priorities and
practices. By refusing to articulate his bargaining policies, the prosecutor insulates himself from the public and professional criticism that is
essential to the healthy functioning of the criminal justice system.35
And if the criminal justice system is, in fact, more administrative
than adversary,"' then those bureaucracies primarily responsible for its
administration-the police and the prosecutor-may have to be subjected to the same kind of controls imposed on other administrative agencies.3 7 That change would necessarily entail the articulation of bargain34. Cf. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prosecutor
may not offer inducements "because his limited resources convince him he must deter
defendants from demanding a trial"). The fact that a bargain serves the systemic need
for efficiency is irrelevant so long as it is primarily motivated by rational judgments
about the appropriateness and the effectiveness of the disposition.
35. THE PROSECunTON FUNCTION, supra note 29, at 66 ("[tlhe public interest will
be best served by having general policies, procedures, and guidelines known to the bar
and, indeed, to the courts").
36. See Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1 (1964).
37. See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSnCE 188-214 (1969); cf. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Courts should
require administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their
discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible.") (footnote omitted).
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ing rules and regulations subject to judicial review. 88
Office Proceduresfor NegotiatingPleas
Although the public may be less interested in how the prosecutor
organized his office for plea bargaining purposes, those procedures, no
less than substantive policies, can affect the bargaining process.19 Here
again the survey showed a wide disparity in office practice. Some
prosecutors retain nearly absolute control over all plea bargains, particularly in superior court cases.
"In Superior Court, the District Attorney is the only one who
[.bargains]."
"Normally, I participate [in bargaining] as a District Attorney."
"The D.A. has the last word."
Other district attorneys delegate complete authority to the staff member
handling the case.
'Each staff member has this authority [to determine the terms of
an agreement]."
"Each Superior Court prosecutor has full authority and discretion to dispose of any matter assigned to him for prosecution."
In fact, the actual practice in most offices probably varies between
these two extremes. Several district attorneys who gave a subordinate
wide latitude emphasized that they remained available for consultation.
"It is not uncommon for the Assistant District Attorney to talk to
me about a proposed disposition."
"When possible, staff members consult each other for information
or advice before making the decision."
Others pointed out that their subordinates reached agreements "within
the limits prescribed by the District Attorney," "according to the policy
of the District Attorney," or "with the consent of the District Attorney."
While a variety of factors such as the personality of the individual
district attorney, the experience of his staff, and past practices may
determine internal office organization, the single most important factor
is probably the size of the office. In a small office, a district attorney
may retain complete control over all bargaining while in a large office he
cannot. In large offices, the district attorney must delegate bargaining
authority to his subordinates, and he must therefore decide what procedures, if any, are necessary to insure uniform disposition of cases.
38. I have elsewhere questioned the wisdom of such an approach. Bond, Book
Review, 15 Am. L. REV. 1031 (1973).
39. See generally White, supra note 3, at 442-43, 447.
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Most district attorneys in this state, as elsewhere, rely on an informal percolation of questions upward to them from their staff and an
equally informal percolation of answers downward from them to their
staff. This informal process may well still be satisfactory in even the
largest offices in this state because they do not exceed ten or twelve
members. In other states where some prosecutional staffs run into the
hundreds, more formal procedures may be necessary. These more
formal procedures might include designation of one or more attorneys as
sole negotiators and/or a requirement that each attorney who negotiates
a plea write a short opinion for office files explaining why he agreed to
the particular disposition. However burdensome such procedures may
seem, they may be necessary in larger offices. And if the judiciary ever
begins to scrutinize plea agreements as it scrutinizes other administrative
decisionmaking, they may become necessary in the smallest offices.
Prosecutors--even those whose staffs are small-might nonetheless profitably follow such procedures. Maintaining an office file of bargaining opinions might serve several useful purposes. The collected
opinions will over time provide the office with more thorough and
sophisticated guidance as the general bargaining policies are interpreted
and applied. They may insure continuity of treatment for defendants
despite personnel changes on the staff. The need to justify the bargain
in writing may also force the prosecutor to consider his decision more
carefully than he otherwise would. He will necessarily be forced periodically to reconsider the assumptions implicit in his bargaining policies.
All these consequences seem desirable although some prosecutors may
conclude that they cost too much in time-consuming paperwork.
CONCLUSION

This article has had a two-fold purpose: first, to describe plea
bargaining practices in North Carolina and, second, to raise questions
about the legitimacy and desirability of those practices. I have not
sought to answer definitively the questions raised although my preference for "rationalization" of the plea bargaining system through adoption of office bargaining policies doubtless showed through the discussion and colored it. The complexity of the problems posed by plea
bargaining and the debatability of solutions proposed probably precludes definitive answers.
But neither the complexity of the problems nor the debatability of
solutions should preclude a search for answers, however illusive they
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may presently seem. Plea bargaining is a central feature of the criminal
justice system, and lawyers have a professional obligation to insure its

fair and just operation. For too long the bar has ignored the troublesome questions inherent in many common plea bargaining practices.

And now that public concern about the propriety of plea bargaining
has forced the bar to acknowledge its existence, the bar has discussed it
in sweeping generalizations that obscure rather than illuminate the

difficult questions that must be answered. The rural prosecutor whose
light caseload permits him to try every case does not contribute intelli-

gently to the debate by condemning all plea bargaining as inherently
bad. And city prosecutors cannot justify every plea bargaining practice

by insisting that the criminal justice system would break down if all plea
bargaining were prohibited. Hopefully, this article will stimulate reflections on some of the narrower and more specific questions, for society

need not choose between no plea bargaining or "lawless' plea bargaining. Rather, the plea bargaining process must be structured so that it

facilitates rather than frustrates the purposes of the criminal justice
system.
APPLNDIX4O
1. Approximately what percentage of all pleas handled through your office are guilty
pleas?
P 80%
K 662'%
F 50%
A 90-95%
Q 50%
L 80-90%
G 33%%
B 60%
R 75%
M 50%43
H 75%
C No answer
S 95%
N 85-90%
I 85%
D 70%
T 50%41
0 54%41
J 60%
E 90%
40. This appendix summarizes the responses to each of the questionnaire inquiries.
As each district attorney was assured that his individual answers would be treated
confidentially, each respondent is identified solely by a letter designation.
Because the questionnaire inquiries invited "free form" answers, summarization
required editing. A "sure" is reported as a "yes"; a "once in awhile," as an "occasionally." Although such editing probably does not mislead, other editing decisions might
create a slightly different nuance from the actual response. For example, an answer that
the violence of any crime was a factor in the prosecutor's bargaining decision was listee
as a "nature of the crime" response. Other answers are sometimes reported without the
qualifications or explanations that respondents added. The answers to question six, for
instance, do not reflect the subtlety of the actual answers. In such instances, however,
the answers are either explored fully in the text itself or explained in the notes to this
appendix. Occasionally a respondent did not answer a question, or his answer defied
summarization. In those instances, the respondent is recorded as not answering.
The questions parallel those asked in a survey conducted over a decade ago by the
editors of the Pennsylvania Law Review. Using basically the same questions facilitated
comparison between results of the present survey with that earlier one. See Note, 112
U. PA. L. Rav. supra note 1.
41. These respondents specified that their estimates applied only to superior court
cases.
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defendants
Is it the practice of your office to make agreements with criminal 42
their counsel), when appropriate, in order to obtain pleas of guilty?
P Yes
K Yes
F Rarely
A Yes
Q Yes
L Yes
G Yes
B Yes
R No
M Generally not
H Yes
C Yes
S Yes
N Yes
I No
D Yes
T Yes
0 No
J Rarely
E Yes
What tve of agreements does your office make?
C.
b.
a.
Do you agree to
recommend a parDo you agn e to
Do you agree to
ticular disposition?
drop chargles?
reduce the charges?
Sometimes
Frequently
A
Yes
15%
No
15%
B
Yes
Yes
Yes
C
Infrequently
Yes
D
Yes
Yes
Yes
E
Yes
Rarely
Yes
Sometimes
F
Yes
Yes
G
Yes
No more
Rarely
Sometimes
H
No
No
I
Occasionally
Rarely
Yes
j
Yes
Yes
Sometimes
Yes
K
Frequently
Seldom
Sometimes
L
No
Yes
Generally not
M
Yes
Yes
N
Yes
Occasionally
Occasional][y
0
Occasionally
Yes
Yes
Yes
P
Yes
Yes
Yes
Q
Sometimes
Seldom
R
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
S
Yes
Rarely
Yes
T
Out of all guilty pleas handled through your office, approximately what percentage
are bargained pleas?
F 20%
P 50%
A 80%
K 15%
G 50%43
L 50%
B 15%
Q 75%
15%
No
answer
M
H 70%
C 50%43
S No answer
N
40-50%
I 10%
D 20%
O 50%43
T 15%
J 10%
E 50%
Would the percentage of guilty pleas decrea se if plea bargaining were eliminated?
P Yes
K Yes
F No
A Yes
Q Yes
L Yes
G Yes
B No
R Yes
M Yes
H Yes44
C Yes
S Yes
N Yes
I No
D No
O Yes
T Yes
J No
E Yes
6. Has your office established45any formal rules or procedures with respect to plea bargaining? If so, what kind?
P No
K One
F No
A No
Q Some
L Yes
G Some
B No answer
R No
M No
H No
C Yes
S One
N No
I No
D No
T No
O Yes
J No
E No
42. Numerous respondents emphasized that they negotiated pleas only when appro.
priate.
43. These respondents specified that their estimates applied only to superior court
cases.
44. This respondent predicted that the number of guilty pleas would increase if
prosecutors refused to bargain. He reasoned that if the hope of negotiating a plea were
removed, "defense attorneys would go ahead and plead (their clients) guilty and argue
punishments to the court."
45. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra for a fuller discussion of the answers
to this question.
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7. Are the terms of a particular agreement determined solely by the staff member
prosecuting the case? 46
A Yes
F Yes
K Most of the time
P No
B Yes
G Usually
L Yes
Q Yes
C Usually
H By and large
M Yes
R No
D No
I No
N Not always
S Mostly
E Yes
I Yes
O Yes
T No
8. What factors
will influence staff members to plea bargain with a particular de47
fendant?
I
Z
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

,o
9

10

2,0~

°'0 °Cu'

z

Q

4

X
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
I
K
L
M
N
0
P

I

x
X

x

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

XX
X
X
x

X
X

X
x
X
x

X
XX

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

Q

X

X

R
S
T

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

46. See text accompanying note 39 supra for a fuller discussion of the answers to
this question.
47. See text accompanying notes 29-38 supra for a fuller discussion of the answers
to this question.
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9. Who normally initiates the first bargaining discussion between defendant and his
representative and the state's (government's) representatives?
A Usually Defendant
F Defendant
K Defendant P Defendant
B Usually Defendant G Defendant 48
L Defendant
Q Defendant
C No answer
H 90% Defendant M Defendant
R Defendant
D Defendant
I Defendant
N Both
S Defendant
E Both
J Both
0 Defendant T Defendant
10. (a) Before counsel is retained or appointed, is it your office's practice to plea
bargain with a defendant?
(b) After counsel is retained or appointed, is it your office's practice to plea
bargain with a defendant?49
a.
b.
a.
b.
A No
No
K Rarely
No
B No
No
L Not normally
No
C No
No
M No
No
D No
No
N Not if he desires
No
E No
No
an attorney
F No
No
0 Not if he desires
No
G No
No
an attorney
H No
No
P Sometimes
No
I No
No
Q Seldom
No
J No
No
RNo
No
S No
No
T No
No
11. Does
A
B
C
D
E

your office ever prepare indictments with plea bargaining
No
F Yes 5511
K Yes
P
5%
G Yes
L Yes
Q
No
H No
M Occasionally
R
1
No 0
I No
N Yes5
S
T
O No
J No
Yes

in mind?
Yes
Yes
No
Rarely
No

48. This respondent probably explained the reluctance of most prosecutors to
broach the subject of a plea: "It's always better for the defense lawyer to initiate. The
State never negotiates from a position of strength, but from weakness."
49. This was an embarrassing question to ask because negotiating directly with a
defendant after he has counsel is unethical. All the respondents recognized that; indeed,
very few prosecutors will talk to a defendant before he has counsel even though that is
permissible in some circumstances.
50. This respondent emphasized that he never "overcharged." Distinguishing
"overcharging" from "full prosecution" is difficult, if not impossible, of course.
51. What most prosecutors usually do, as these respondents explicitly state, is
charge the highest offense which the evidence will sustain.
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12. What roles does the judge play in the bargaining process?
a.
b.
C.
CA Sometimes
No
t
Yes
S B No
No
.5 Yes
"
C Sometimes
"
No
7
Yes
3
D Sometimes
8 Sometimes
.4
Yes
to
E Yes
e s
Yes
.
F Frequently
"
Sometimes
0 Sometimes

*~ G Yes
H Sometimes
I No.

Cd

0

~

S
S
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I
K
L
M
N
0

Occasionally
No
No
Occasionally
Sometimes
Rarely

PYes
Q Rarely
R No
S Yes
T=Yes

2

2
d

'

.

as
$
5
4
e

No

No
No
Yes
No
No
Occasionally
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
yes

Yes

o

0
8
",

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

.

d.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sometimes

Yes
Yes
ed No answer
a Yes

'9
8

Yes
Yes
Yes
,
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Occasionally
Yes
1
Yes
Yes
0
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

yes

o

13. In the absence of any agreement, does a defendant who pleads guity generally
receive a lesser sentence than
- a similar defendant who pleads not guilty and goes
to trial and is found guilty?5
A Sometimes
F Sometimes
K Yes
P Yes
B Yes
G Usually
L No answer
Q Yes
* No answer
H Yes
M No
R Yes
*E Usually
IJ Yes
N
Yes
8,
Yes
No
0 Yes
T Yes
Yes
14. Will the new statutory authorization of bargaining (N.C. GEN. STAr. § 15A-I021
(Sapp. 1975) ) alter your bargaining practices at all?53
A No
F No
K Yes
P No
B No
G No
L No
Q No
C No
H Yes
M Possibly
R No
D No
,I No
N No
S No
E No
J No
0 No
T No
52. See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra for a faller discussion of the answers
to this
53.question.
See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra for a fuller discussion of the answers
to this question.

